The complexity of modern products, systems, and processes makes the task to identify, characterise, and provide sumcient assurance about the desirable properties a major challenge. Stakeholders also demand' a degree of enhanced confidence about the absence of 
end-users, demand a similar degree of enhanced confidence about the absence of undesirable properties often with a potential to cause harm or loss, for such products, systems, or processes, We develop and propose a framework of seven fundamental facets of performance as an ontology for emergent behavioural properties and a separate framework for the emergent structural properties in complex and/or large scale systems of systems. Understanding and managing complexity, as well as characterising structure are central to this work. The need for conceptualisation, analysis, assessment, and enhanced confidence in the properties of complex systems, specifically the emergent behavioural aspects is subsequently explored where we develop and propose a systems framework for assurance based on an Assessment and Management paradigm each comprising a number of principles and processes. The key argument advanced is that in the face of complexity and incessant change, enhanced confidence in the achievement of desirable and avoidance of undesirable properties itself requires a systems app roach, supported by appropriate modelling tools and diagnostics. These are needed to understand the nature of emergent properties as features of aggregation in complex processes, and thus help us to avoid making erroneous decisions with costly and sometimes irreversible consequences. Our principal focus is on safety, security, and sustainability emergent behavioural (performance) aspects of complex products, systems and processes, but the framework has more general validity.
COMPLEXITY AND EMERGENT PROPERTIES
Complex Systems is the term that emerges in many disciplines and domains and has many interpretations, implications, and problems associated with it. The specific domain provides dominant features and charilcterises the nature of problems to be considered A very significant class of complexity issues is that linked to design and operation of industrial systems. The distinguishing features of this area is the close link between modelling, system structure and properties, measurement information and control-decision making management structures which requires a systems framework.
Systems complexity is multi-dimensional and progressing beyond the stage of problem conceptualizati on is a challenge.
Herein, our interest is focused on aspects of systems performance. Much akin to most products and systems, the performance of complex systems is a measure of their utility, output, and perceived or real emergent properties. The key facets to a general system's properties can be summari zed as:
1) Characterisation and Management of
Complexity;
2) Emergent structural properties; and
3) Emergent behavioural properties.
Problem complexity is manifested in many different ways which include:
1) Lack of knowledge, or diffi culties in characterising the behaviour of the basic process (Unit Behavioural Complexity).
2) Complexity of computational engines
(Computational Complexity).
3) Diffi culties in characterising the interconnection topology of sub-processes and/or variability, uncertainty of this topology during the system life-cycle (Interconnection Topology Complexity).
4) Large scale dimensionality (Large Scale
Complexity)
5)
Heterogeneous nature of sub-processes, resulting in hybrid forms of behaviour (Hybrid Behavioural Complexity).
6)
Organisational alternatives for the jimctioning, information, and decision-making (control) structures in response to goals and operational requirements (Organisational Complexity).
7)
Variability and/or uncertainty on the system's environment during the life-cycle requiring flexibility in organisation (Life-cycle Complexity 1) Same accident may arise from a mUltiplicity of diff erent causative factors;
2) Ac cident investigations are predominately driven by legal imperatives and the need for finding a responsible personlbody as opposed to the systemic understanding of the underlying root causes;
3) Increasing pace of change, innovation, and complexity in modern systems creates opportunities for new forms of accidents as yet unencountered; and
4)
The social, legal, and organizational costs associated with accidents are constantly on the rise in view of the increasing public awareness, regulation, and the litigation process. 
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In sharp contrast to the reactive learning from accidents, the systems approach to safety assurance principally focuses on empirical as well as creative identification of hazards.
Once a suite of key hazardous states are proactively identified and ranked, it explores their causes, random or systematic [7] , scrutinises their escalation scenarios, and devises risk control and mitigation strategies [1] . Crucial for this approach is the need for a general systems framework that defines the relevant states.
2) The Need for System Safety Metrics
Safety is a human-focused concept reflecting the degree of freedom from unacceptable harm to people. Paradoxically, it is often measured by its absence for example, the safety of products, processes, systems, and missions is regularly quoted in terms of risk of harm they may cause/entail to specific groups as opposed to the expected duration of harm-free operation akin to reliability! The other fallacy is to forecast the safety of a complex system principally based on the empirical or past performance of similar systems, a notion which relates to random rather than systematic causes of hazards, naively assuming that the future is a simple (linear) evolution of the past.
Safety is predominately measured in terms of risk which is a forecast comprising the likelihood/frequency of an accident and the degree of loss that it may entail. This poses a challenge to many duty holders or system designers who find it difficult if not impossible to relate the faults and failures of their products or systems to likely injuries and fatalities to the end-users. To this end, some system standards [7] have advocated hazard rates as a direct measure of system safety, leading to the classification of system's safety properties in terms of Safety Integrity Level (SIL). The SIL concept which has a widespread following in the industry is more akin to a reliability perspective and is a nonsystemic convention without much regard to the consequences of the so-called dangerous failures [9] .
Some sector standards, strangely derivatives of the IEC system standard [7] , such as those for safety critical transport
[8] advocate Tolerable Hazard Rates (THR), taking into account a total systemic perspective and the notion of . tolerability of risk. There's a need for systemic metrics which go beyond failure and additionally take into account exposure of various groups at risk as well as the potential escalation scenarios and tolerability criteria [17] . The THR concept which is principally reliant on historical performance of systems goes a fair way toward this ideal but fails to explicitly address all requisite factors in one cogent metric.
Whatever the approach, there's a need for a portfolio of systemic lead as well as lag indicators for safety, security, and sustainability of complex cybernetic systems. We will address this issue further herein.
System Security Concepts
Unlike safety, security has many different interpretations and contextual implications for its stakeholders. From a systems perspective, security is the lack of susceptibility to malicious intent which may comprise: I) Vandalism; 2) Sabotage; 3) Theft and fraudulent gain; 4) Terrorism; or any combination thereof. Whatever the context, security or lack of it is principally characterized by the intent on causing harm therefore, it is currently at least, a mostly human-focused issue. However, in the cybernetics domain, this may eventually become a concern between autonomous intelligent systems without direct human intervention, in spite of the three laws of robotics as laid down by Asimov [6] .
1) The Systems Approach to Security
There are two fundamental facets to security of a general system. The extrinsic dimension or driver is threat, In a synergistic manner to systems safety assurance cited earlier, the main thrust of systems security assurance therefore rests upon systematic identification of key vulnerabilities, analysis of the causations and potential escalation scenarios and evaluation of pertinent risks. This is followed by proactive development of elimination or control strategies for major vulnerabilities and identification of detection, containment, or mitigation solutions in the event of realisation of threats. However, in a similar mann er to the systems safety-related precursors (hazards), vulnerabilities as an intrinsic facet of a system's architecture or operation are mostly a concern at the system boundary. A further elaboration of this may lead to the consideration of internal and external threats and vulnerabilities with major implications for systems security which is beyond the scope of the curre nt debate. In Systems-of-Systems (SoS) or large open systems with a significant degree of vulnerabilities, security is often assured through focus on threats rather than vulnerabilities. However, combined treatment of the intrinsic and extrinsic facets of the system are preferred where practicable.
2) The Need for System Security Metrics However, these are principally threat criteria relating to terrorism. The higher the Threat Condition or index, the greater the risk of a terrorist attack where risk includes both the probability of an attack occurrin g and its potential losses.
In a similar manner to the threats, metrics are called for systems vulnerabilities since these render a system susceptible to damage and harm, even in the absence of malicious intent at the outset. Even though the safety concept of SIL is not truly indicative of the safety properties of a complex system [9] , it is more appropriate for measurement of vulnerability since this is an intrinsic (architectural, compositional, and operational) system property. A credible metric for a cybernetic system's vulnerability would provide an objective measure of its resilience against potential threats. This could be a System Resilience Index which needs to be elaborated and quantified for various classes of vulnerability.
System Sustainability Concepts

1) The Systems Approach to Sustainability
Sustainability is a high level emergent system property that expresses the ability of the system to survive and continue to function according to the original goals set for its operation. It is thus related to:
1) Robustness of the system behaviour to external disturbances ;
2) Ability to overcome threats that may have catastrophic consequences by demonstrating capabilities to survive and achieve the central goal;
3) Adaptability by demonstrating capability to reorgonise its control and information structures after some catastrophic events, or changes in the operational goals of the system due to changes in the market; and 4) Potential for the system to evolve in a continuously changing environment of goals, specifications and constraints.
In principle, apart from survivability and resilience attributes, sustainability possesses social, economic, and enviornmental dimensions as well, making it a complex composite property in its own right. It is clear therefore that the basic concepts required to define sustainability are themselves emergent system properties and it is this that makes sustainability a higher level emergent property.
2) The Need for System Sustainability Metrics
Defining sustainability as an emergent higher level, or composite property implies that we need to: 1) Identify the constituent (primitive) emergent properties,
2) Develop diagnostics for characterising and evaluating the primitive emergent properties,
3) Develop a coneptual system framework expressing sustainability as composition, aggregation of simple-primitive emergent properties, and/or 4) Develop a metamodel expressing this aggregation and enabling the evaluation-measurement of sustainability.
Developing metrics for sustainability is a challenging problem that has to address all issues described above. The difficulties are due to the characterisation of primitive emergent properties in terms that may be quantified, as well as expressing the composition in a way that supports the development of composite metrics. These tasks are beyond the scope of this.
SYSTEMS SAFETY, SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE:
THE FRAMEWORK
We propose two complementary and advanced sets of systems principles and processes as the undetpinning backbone to tackling the challenges of safety, security, and potentially sustainability in products, processes, systems, and undertakings. Taking This comprises recognising the need, defining the system, specifying and identifying/understanding of key properties, behaviours, hazards, and vulnerabilities, evaluating and assessing expected impact;
2) Realisation: This is ultimately aimed at realising the desirable properties and achieving the desired performance in the form of product, process, system, mission, or undertaking; and/or
3) Management:
This comprises taking the outcome of assessment and realisation into consideration and ensuring deployment, delivery of requisite performance, continued monitoring, and control through a responsive and holistic suite of strategies, resources, and actions.
Whilst Realisation is specific to a given domain and context, the Assessment and Management aspects as a suite of principles constitute a meta-knowledge framework which can be abstracted and developed for almost universal application across many domains and disciplines. The systemic framework of assessment and management is equally applicable and effective within the context of desirable as well as undesirable properties of products, systems, and endeavours. This is contrary to the curre nt conventional wisdom where specification, delivery, and continual monitoring of desirable aspects of performance is regarded as an essentially domain expertise where as the undesirable and unintended emergent properties (hazards and vulnerabilities) are the forte of so-called risk management. The +Safe3 extension [11] to the renowned CMMi model [14] also distinguishes between Safety Engineering & Safety Management, which are mainly synonymous with Risk Assessment and Risk Management advocated here.
Whilst presented as a dual and complementary suite of principles and processes, assessment and management are iterative and systemic in the sense that processes inherent in the management framework employ assessment activities at requisite points to support judicious decision-making and ensuring optimal performance. These are collectively referred to as Systems Assurance and labeled as Surety Framework herein.
Risk Assessment
This key facet of Surety Framework is proposed as a backbone to the identification, specification, evaluation, and assessment of the undesirable events or properties adversely affecting technical functionality, cost, reliability, safety, quality, etc. The risk assessment process [13] comprises seven systemic aspects such as:
2) Causal Analysis; The risk assessment process, whilst systematic and comprehensive, is aimed at enhancing the systemic understanding of the key issues and is not treated as an end in itself. Assessment process generates transparency and awareness of real and potential issues thus empowering the duty holders to take appropriate actions and make the transition from fire fighting and reactivity to anticipation and proactivity.
Risk Management
A holistic and systemic approach to assurance of safety and security properties of generic products, processes, systems, or undertakings is developed and proposed in a major paper [4] . This elaborates seven principles which have to be collectively fulfilled before sufficient assurance is gained and maintained in the desirable safety and security properties of a general or cybernetic system. This complementary aspect of assurance within the Surety Framework comprises an advanced and systematic approach to developing, sustaining, enhancing, and managing the so-called downside events and properties associated with any complex product, process, system or undertaking. Risk management builds upon the outcome of systematic assessment and ensures the identified and prioritized risks are eliminated, mitigated, or continually controlled in a comprehensive and responsive mann er.
The proposed systems suite of principles demands a thorough and structured scrutiny of the problem domain as the key stage in safety/security assurance followed by a number of complementary and value-added activities. The principles underpinning the systemic and holistic management of safety and security are: The nature and essential aspects of the principles are detailed in [4] . However, the suite of seven principles is equally applicable to cybernetic systems in which, in view of the complexity (spatial, temporal, or both) or novelty, assurance is mainly derived from the quality of the process and competencies of those involved.
IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE, FEBRUARY 2011
AppHeation of the Framework
The systemic framework of assessment and management proposed herein is applicable to the attainment, maintenance and continual enhancement of three key and increasingly regulated aspects of safety, security, and the environmental performance/sustainability of general and cybernetic systems.
Nano-technology poses a modem and innovative domain where the safety and security and the environmental implications of its products and offerings are largely unknown even by purveyors of the relevant products and services. An illustrative case involves the marketing of cosmetics containing nano-particles [10] . Because of their far smaller size, these particles are absorbed deeper into epidermis, dermis, cells, and eventually into the blood stream of the users. The significant uncertainty on the risks has led to calls from the UK Royal Society and the US Federal Drug Administration (FDA) for a comprehensive research programm e into the likely effects. In the meantime, the cosmetics industry considers nanoparticles a "hot technology" with lots of intriguing applications, allocating vast sums to research into nano-technology. The FDA maintains that urgent research is called for due to the paucity of the knowledge on the effects of the nano-particles when they enter cells in the human body or leach into the blood stream. A systemic framework constitutes a potent weapon in the face of such huge uncertainties with major implications for human society at large.
The seven underpinning principles for risk management can be mapped to the requirements of any domain at any level of abstraction or details, namely: 2) Assessment and quantification of these networks and generation of an overall numerical index for each principle in the framework [3 J; and 3 ) Generation of a combined figure of merit (System Integrity and Resilience Index-SIRI) for the whole generic or cybernetic system under consideration, based on the seven indices derived for each principle.
Such indices can be benchmarked against desirable or tolerable levels of safety, security, and environmental performance thus providing a reference level for the optimal assurance under each individual principle as well as the whole framework applied to a system.
This generates an advanced, focused, and responsive system for attainment, management, and continual enhancement of safety and security properties at the pertinent application level.
CONCLUSIONS
Amongst the seven key facets of a system's performance cited earlier, the safety, security, and the environmental/global aspects are increasingly regulated by governments [17, 19] . This is partly driven by the gradual enhancement in the quality of life and public's awareness and demand for a more socially responsible stance by duty holders; private and public corporations, service providers, Re-engineering for improved systems assurance is an area where future research has to develop. Such efforts, however, require an appropriate systems framework [15, 16] that can support analysis and design by following paths similar to those deployed for hard systems.
We have developed and proposed an integrated framework comprising assessment and management paradigms labeled Increasing confidence and certainty.
Lives saved, improvements made, damages prevented or avoided in the natural habitat or benefits accrued to a business/society or a combination thereof The expected value of a future benefit.
Object, state, or condition which in the absence of adequate detection or containment could lead to an accident.
Soundness of body and mind, freedom from ill ness.
Physical harm to people, detriment to a business/society or damage/destruction of the natural habitat, or a combination thereof Aforecast for a desirable event or gain.
A forecast for an accident or loss. The expected value of a future loss.
A (purposeful) composite of interrelated parts / elements with discernible collective output(s) or emergent property(ies) not manifested by any of the elements.
Freedom of people from (physical) harm.
Freedom from vulnerability or loss caused by deliberate and malicious acts.
A blend of social, economic, and environmental considerations which render a product, system, or undertaking viable and continually optimal.
The art, science and technology of ensuring and demonstrating that a system is likely to achieve its objectives without engendering unacceptable levels of loss.
The art, science and technology of ensuring and demonstrating that a system is not likely to lead to unacceptable levels of (physical) harm to people.
Systems Security:
The art, science, and technology of ensuring and demonstrating that a system is not likely to be vulnerable to malicious deliberate acts aimed at engendering unacceptable levels of loss.
Vulnerability: Susceptibility to injury, fatality, or loss.
Well-being and quality of life for
Welfare:
individuals and society.
